The identification of the Stuxnet worm in 2010 provided a highly publicized example of a cyber attack used to damage an industrial control system physically. This raised public awareness about the possibility of similar attacks against other industrial targets -including critical infrastructure. In this paper, we use hypergames to analyze how adversarial perturbations can be used to manipulate a system using optimal control. Hypergames form an extension of game theory that enables us to model strategic interactions where the players may have significantly different perceptions of the game(s) they are playing. Past work with hypergames has been limited to relatively simple interactions consisting of a small set of discrete choices for each player, but here, we apply hypergames to larger systems with continuous variables. We find that manipulating constraints can be a more effective attacker strategy than directly manipulating objective function parameters. Moreover, the attacker need not change the underlying system to carry out a successful attack -it may be sufficient to deceive the defender controlling the system. It is possible to scale our approach up to even larger systems, but the ability to do so will depend on the characteristics of the system in question, and we identify several characteristics that will make those systems amenable to hypergame analysis.
Introduction

Stuxnet and Cyber-Physical Security
The Stuxnet worm was identified in 2010 as a piece of malware that targeted a very specific Industrial Control System (ICS) -namely, a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran [1, 2] . This may not have been the first cyber attack to cause physical damage to an ICS. Bumgarner highlights a supposed logic bomb attack carried out by the CIA against a Siberian pipeline as a potential prior example, and he also mentions a demonstration conducted by the Idaho National Laboratory showing how a cyber attack could be capable of destroying an electric generator [3] . That being said, Stuxnet was highly publicized as those incidents were not, and it brought the potential physical consequences of cyber attacks into the public eye.
Langner [4] has provided perhaps the most detailed technical analysis of Stuxnet and how it functioned. Stuxnet was highly sophisticated and employed two different attack modes. Part of its sophistication lay in its stealth: Stuxnet fed fake data to the ICS to disguise malicious actions, manipulated sensor calibrations, monitored the system to determine when to attack, and limited its attacks to avoid detection. The goal of Stuxnet was not to cause catastrophic failure, which would have been easier. Rather, it exploited the physical vulnerabilities inherent in the ICS and caused centrifuges to fail more frequently but still in an expected fashion -even the consequences of the attack did not appear especially unusual [5] . Carrying this out required extensive domain knowledge and testing prior to releasing Stuxnet.
This attack forced analysts to consider the risk associated with these kinds of cyber attacks. If we understand risk as the product of consequence, vulnerability, and threat, we can address each of those components separately. The potential for significant consequence is clear: many industrial processes, including critical infrastructure systems (e.g., the power grid), rely on SCADA software and ICSs, just as the enrichment facility in Natanz did. These systems are also vulnerable. The old consensus was that these systems were too specialized to attack [6] . SCADA is also time-consuming to patch [1] , there is no anti-virus for ICSs [2] , and from a control engineer standpoint, updates can be risky because they may cause previously functional systems to produce new errors [6] . There is a tradeoff between security and ease of use, and a knowledge gap between cyber security specialists and control engineers can compound this.
There are two more factors that increase the vulnerability of ICSs to cyber attack. Firstly, industrial and infrastructure systems are often serviced by outside contractors, and the devices (computers, USB drives, etc.) used by those contractors can provide a malwarevector that bypasses traditional cyber security measures such as air gaps. Langner suggests that this is likely how Stuxnet entered into the Natanz facility network [4] . Secondly, industry standardization also reduces uncertainty for potential attackers [5] . Complexity, heterogeneity, and uncertainty make it more difficult for attackers to design successful attacks.
The most significant disagreement regarding the risk of cyber attacks on ICSs has to do with threat. Langner sees the Stuxnet attack as very specific but the general approach behind Stuxnet as more general [4] . If it is possible to obtain the relevant control engineering expertise -and Langner sees disgruntled control engineers as an easy source of this -then nation-state resources are not required to carry out such attacks. Denning, on the other hand, claims that the resources needed for developing and testing such attacks make it unlikely that non-state actors would use such techniques [7] . In the case of terrorism, for example, it is easier to build a bomb than to write code that will cause comparable physical destruction. It is important to note, as Lindsay does, that there do not yet exist any general cyber munitions (as in conventional armaments) [5] . This means that each attack relies on detailed intelligence and a custom-designed 'digital warhead' -successful attacks will likely be sophisticated and designed with the particulars of the target system taken into account.
Building Control Security
Many large commercial buildings use sophisticated Building Automation Systems (BASs) to monitor and control a wide variety of building equipment. With the availability of real-time equipment and sensor data, BAS reduce the need for manual operator tuning of advanced control sequences and ensure continuous automated commissioning of building operation commands to maximize system efficiency and performance [8, 9] . BASs can control large equipment, such as the Heating, Ventilation and Air-conditioning (HVAC) systems, so even small changes in operational set-points can dramatically affect the comfort and energy consumption of an entire building [10] . With the rapid growth of the Internet-of-Things, standard communication protocols, such as BACnet and LonWorks, were introduced to facilitate interoperability of connected BAS components using publically accessible networks [11, 12] . For example, BACnet allows remote connectivity over the internet to control building activities such as heating and cooling, lighting and fire detection.
In the absence of well-designed security measures, building equipment may become highly susceptible to cyber-physical attacks. For example, an unsecured system can provide easy targeted access not only to the HVAC control systems but also to the floor plans and system occupancy information of a building, which can facilitate potential industrial espionage [10] . Vulnerable networks of buildings can also provide an easy access point for attackers to cause potential disruptions in the power grid. Therefore, it is instructive to study the cyberphysical systems created by BAS and evaluate the security and reliability of those systems.
Hypergames
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that looks at strategic interactions between rational entities. It has seen considerable use in economic [13] and security [14] applications. A fundamental premise of strategic games in game theory is that all of the players are seeing and playing the same game. This is not always true, though. Belief manipulation plays a key role in some strategic interactions. In other cases, not all player objectives may be common knowledge. This necessitates understanding more completely players' perceptions of the game(s) they are playing, and one way to model this is through hypergames [15] .
Hypergames allow players to play different games and can account for differences in their perceptions of the same game without considering uncertainty probabilistically. For example, one group of players may distinguish between certain actions while another group considers those actions all to be identical. On the other hand, some players may not be aware of the existence of other players in the game (or may not be aware of all of those other players' actions). Hypergames essentially enable us to extend the concept of rationality to a bounded information situation. This, in turn, makes it possible for a given player to exploit another player's misperceptions. In analyzing the (potentially) different games that each player is playing, though, we are still able to apply game theoretic concepts and thus build on existing game theory research.
Various approaches such as reflexive control [16] , Mirage Equilibria [17] , and k-level reasoning [18, 19] have been used to extend game theory to systems that may not have common knowledge (and thereby incorporate a kind of bounded rationality). Despite some differences in notation and nomenclature, these approaches all incorporate hierarchies of beliefs (e.g., Player 1's beliefs about Player 2's beliefs). However, the first two, along with hypergames, differ somewhat from k-level reasoning with respect to the accuracy of the player perceptions. In k-level reasoning, the focus is on the degree to which one player anticipates another. In principle, this approach does not rule out the possibility that a given player might misperceive the nature of the game (payoff structure, available actions, etc.), but in practice, this is not a key consideration. For hypergames, though, this is a key consideration. The concept of a subjective game (i.e., the game that each player believes to be the true game) is central to hypergame analysis, and belief hierarchies exist to support that; the same is true, mutatis mutandis for reflexive control and Mirage Equilibria.
For example, a key hypergame result is that hypergame equilibrium solutions can be stable under misperceptions [20] . In these cases, each player does what the other players expect -which can happen even when the players' perceptions differ or are erroneousand thus there is no motivation for players to update their perceptions. This is similar to a conjectural equilibrium [17] in that players do not know what they do not know. In a repeated hypergame context, then, these equilibria are stable, and extending belief hierarchies to higher and higher levels would not necessarily change that.
Hypergames have been used to study water resource management [21] , supply chain relationships [22] , and cyber attacks [23] . Some research has also looked at connecting hypergames with other branches of game theory. Kanazawa et al. [24] studied an evolutionary version of hypergames. This included calculating evolutionarily stable strategies and defining hypergame replicator dynamics. Sasaki and Kijima [25, 26] showed how hypergames can be reformulated as Bayesian games (at least in some cases). In doing so, though, they identified reasons why it may be advantageous to avoid that reformulation. Firstly, hypergames can provide a simpler and more natural epistemic representation of the game's players; the treatment of unawareness, for example, can be more convincing than in the Bayesian case. Secondly, there are some hypergame solution concepts, such as stability under misperception, that do not map to the Bayesian reformulation.
The topic of misperception has also led to research into how repeated hypergames can be used to improve or update perceptions [20] . House and Cybenko use both hidden Markov models and a maximum entropy approach [23] . Takahashi et al., on the other hand, use a genetic algorithm [27] . Generally speaking, though, the hypergame literature is relatively small; Kovach et al. provide a review of the field [28] . Moreover, all of the examples that we have seen have involved hypergames with a relatively small number of discrete choices. Solving for the equilibrium solutions, then, has involved hand calculations and/or exhaustive enumeration.
Aim and Motivation
The goal of this paper is to show how hypergames can be used in optimal control where the control system in question is subject to adversarial perturbations and to demonstrate how this analysis can apply to Stuxnet-like attacks. This research contributes to ongoing work in optimal control by showing how manipulating controller perceptions can function as an attacker strategy; the attacker actually uses the control system against itself. These analyses then highlight weaknesses in the control system -weaknesses that are vulnerable to attack even if they might not be vulnerable to random events.
This research also advances hypergame research in two ways. Firstly, it brings hypergames to bear on a new application area (optimal control) -one rather different than the examples in previous papers. Secondly, it applies hypergame concepts to systems of significantly greater complexity than previous hypergame research has used. The examples in this paper have continuous variables, and the second example is a discrete-time optimal control problem with time-varying variables. Both problems, moreover, require using numerical optimization methods to find hypergame equilibria. Taking hypergames to this level of complexity makes the hypergame concept more viable as a tool for analyzing real systems and not just toy problems.
This kind of investigation is highly relevant to addressing Stuxnet-like attacks from a control perspective. Leaving aside IT-based cyber security concerns, let us assume that an attacker has access to at least part of an ICS. Can we then characterize the kind of damage that that attacker could produce, and can we design control procedures that minimize that damage? In this paper, we focus primarily on the former but touch upon the latter; we intend to address the latter more fully in later work. ICSs provide examples of (potentially highimpact) cyber-physical systems where control provides the connection between the 'cyber' and 'physical' components. The idea behind this research, then, is not to replace traditional cyber security methods but rather to recognize that control systems can be used to provide another layer of robustness to attack if those control systems are designed to do so and that the physical weaknesses accessible through cyber means can be analyzed by looking at the control model.
Problem Formulation
Static Fan Optimization
As an initial demonstration, we consider a problem that is constant in time: minimizing power consumption for a fan in an HVAC system. A problem like this could form a component in a larger HVAC system, possibly as a subsystem subject to repeated optimization under changing parameter values. This minimization is then constrained to function within an operating envelope, which we can represent as an inequality constraint. The baseline defender optimization problem is min m,p
where m is the mass flow rate, p is the static pressure, the θ values are power consumption parameters for the fan, and c m , c p , and c r are parameters defining the operating envelope. In our computations in the rest of the paper, we use θ 1 = θ 2 = 1, θ 3 = 2, c m = c p = 5, and c 2 r = 10. The 1 2 constant does not change the mathematical properties of the optimization, but its presence simplifies some of the calculations used later in this paper; see Appendix A for these calculations.
Objective Function Manipulation
With this model in place, we can consider what happens when an attacker manipulates the power consumption parameters θ i to increase power usage by the defender. We also specify a cost function to limit the perturbations ∆θ i that the attacker can impose:
The attacker cost function is somewhat arbitrary, but it is sufficient for our purposes in that it bounds the total perturbation that the attacker can achieve while also having a monotonically increasing incremental cost for increasing perturbations. Essentially, it represents the attacker's desire to remain undetected by using perturbations below a certain threshold.
We begin by considering the outcome when the attacker can manipulate the true θ i values and the defender is aware of this. The min-max problem is
Next, we consider the situation when the attacker manipulates the defender's perceptions of θ i (though not the real values). The attacker's optimization is
subject to the defender's optimization min m,p
Following this, we can consider the case where the defender knows of the attacker's manipulations, though the defender only perceives the perturbed values. The defender optimization is min m,p
where ∆θ i is calculated by solving the optimization that the defender thinks the attacker is solving (i.e., manipulating the perceptions of an unsuspecting defender). Note that the defender is using the identity θ i =θ i −∆θ i to determine the true value of θ i from the perceived valuesθ i and the calculated perturbations ∆θ i . The optimization that the defender thinks the attacker is solving is
subject to the supposed defender optimization min m,p
Given that the defender only knowsθ i , not θ i , solving the attacker's problem to determine ∆θ i will require using θ i =θ i − ∆θ i . This is relatively straightforward, though.
Finally, we consider the scenario where the attacker manipulates the defender's perceptions of θ i , the defender knows that the attacker is doing this, and the attacker knows that the defender is anticipating the attacker's perturbations. We refer to this as a 'double-bluff' manipulation here and in the rest of the paper. This problem leads us to a multi-level optimization problem. At level 1, we have the attacker optimization
subject to the defender optimization at level 2. The defender performs his optimization based on the belief that the values he perceives,θ i , have been perturbed by an attacker manipulating the perceptions of an unsuspecting defender. The defender's optimization is min m,p
where ∆θ i is calculated by solving the optimization (level 3) that the defender thinks the attacker is solving (i.e., manipulating the perceptions of an unsuspecting defender):
subject to the defender optimization (level 4) min m,p
whereθ i =θ i − ∆θ i is the defender's estimate of the true value of θ i . There are many other potential combinations of misperceptions that we could also consider. The examples shown above, though, are sufficient to illustrate the kinds of objective function manipulations that an attacker could employ.
Constraint Manipulation
The previous section involved the attacker manipulating weights in the objective function. In this case, there is a significant difference between manipulating the true values and the defender's perceptions. If the attacker is manipulating the constraints, however, then the distinction changes. If the attacker alters the constraint to be more restrictive, then it does not matter whether the manipulation is of the real constraint or of the defender's perceptions -both actions lead to the same result (assuming that the defender abides by the constraint), and the power usage that the defender measures is the real power usage in both cases. If the attacker alters the constraint to be less restrictive, the results are less clear. If the attacker manipulates the defender perception, the control process may hit a physical limit and/or damage the system trying to reach an infeasible state. This could be modelled by having some kind of large penalty function for violations of the true constraint. Manipulating the true constraint in such a way as to relax it may be impossible if the constraint is a physical limitation of the system.
For this section, we specify that the attacker can manipulate the defender's perception of parameters in the constraint (ĉ m = c m + δ m ,ĉ p = c p + δ p , andĉ r = c r − δ r , whereĉ m ,ĉ p , andĉ r are the quantities that the defender perceives). These perturbations are then subject to a cost function as with the objective function parameter perturbations.
If the attacker is manipulating the defender's perceptions to maximize power consumption, the attacker's optimization, with the lower-level defender optimization, is
min m,p
If the defender believes that his perceptions are being manipulated, he has to solve the following optimization to calculate and counter the perturbations:
subject to the attacker optimization listed above. If the attacker knows that the defender is anticipating an attack, the attacker is still trying to maximize power consumption but is now subject to a version of this defender optimization. For the sake of brevity, we have avoided writing out the entire multi-level optimizations here, but it would follow essentially the same pattern as the hypergames in Section 2.1.1.
The attacker could also try to cause the defender to deviate maximally from the operating envelope constraint in the interest of causing a catastrophic failure. The attacker's optimization, with lower-level defender optimization, is
If the defender is anticipating an attacker's perturbation, the optimization is min m,p
subject to a version of the attacker optimization listed above. If the attacker knows that the defender is anticipating an attack, the attacker is still trying to break the system but is now subject to a version of this defender optimization. Again, the precise details of the hypergames would follow the pattern given in Section 2.1.1 but with different perturbations. See Appendix A for the full formulations and derivations.
Single-Zone HVAC Control
To bring hypergames to bear on a true time-varying optimal control problem, we can consider a single-zone HVAC system with a fan, heater, and chiller. The control objective is to minimize power consumption subject to physical constraints (e.g., the temperature evolution for the zone in question) and operational constraints (e.g., the temperatures at the beginning and end of the optimization time horizon must be identical).
Baseline Model
The baseline optimal control problem for the HVAC system is
where m t is the mass flow rate, T t i is the internal duct temperature, T t s is the temperature of the air put out by the chiller, T t s,n is the temperature of the air supplied to the zone, T t n is the temperature of the zone, and d t is the damper position. All of these are control variables. T t 0 is the external temperature (set to 25 • C in this instantiation of the model); β and γ are parameters that capture the room thermal properties. Other quantities listed in the problem description are parameters that are not affected by any adversarial perturbations. The fan, heater, and chiller power consumption levels at each time step are
respectively. In this model, the static pressure is almost constant, and thus we omit it from the fan component of the model.
Static Parameter Manipulation
We first consider the attacker manipulating the defender perception of β and γ. The attacker goal is to maximize power consumption over the entire time horizon given thatβ = β + ∆β, γ = γ + ∆γ, and
subject to the defender optimization of the original baseline problem. The defender optimization is with respect to perceived values, not real values. Note also that the attacker constraint function is slightly different than in previous cases because β and γ are of different magnitudes; this cost function considers relative perturbations, not absolute ones, and thus avoids some potential problems. The attacker perturbations mean that there will be a difference between the defender's perception of certain quantities and the actual value of those quantities. For example, the true zone temperature, T t n , and the defender perception of the zone temperature,T t n , will evolve according to the equations, respectively,
There will be a similar discrepancy between T t i andT t i .
Dynamic Parameter Manipulation
We also consider the attacker manipulating the defender's perception of T t 0 to maximize power consumption. This will be subject to the defender optimization of the baseline problem with perturbed values of T t
As in the static parameter manipulation case, the defender will misperceive both T t n and T t i . The full formulations for the static and dynamic manipulation problems are provided in Appendix B.
Computational Implementation
The specific calculations used to turn each hypergame problem into a tractable nonlinear program (NLP) are provided in Appendices A and B. We summarize our general approach here. Initially, each hypergame produced a multi-level optimization problem. To solve this, we took the optimality conditions of the lower level problems and wrote them out as complementarity conditions. In the case of the fan optimization, we were able to transform these complementarity conditions into equality constraints and then solve the resulting problem as an NLP. For the HVAC problem, we were not able to do this, and this left us with a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) [29] . We solved the MPEC as a series of NLPs by relaxing the complementarity constraints and penalizing the relaxation with a progressively increasing weight. In practice, this was both reliable and efficient. To implement our approach, we derived the necessary optimality conditions by hand, coded up the NLPs in MATLAB [30] , and solved the NLPs using fmincon. Table 1 shows the results for the attacker manipulation of the objective function parameters; power consumption values in brackets indicate the power usage perceived by the defender where it differs from the actual usage. In Table 1 , we see that manipulating the true θ i values produced a notable increase in power consumption compared with the baseline. Manipulating defender perceptions, though, proved less effective. For example, when the attacker manipulated the perceptions of an unsuspecting defender (Perception Manipulation), the gap between the perceived and actual power usage was noticeable, but the actual increase in power relative to the baseline case was small. Similarly, if the defender erroneously thought that the attacker was manipulating the perceived values of θ i (Faulty Defender Anticipation), the true power usage was almost identical to the baseline case, though the perceived power consumption was somewhat higher.
Results
Static Fan Optimization
When manipulating the defender's perceptions, the attacker got the defender to increase m and decrease p (relative to the baseline case) by decreasing the perceived value of θ 1 and θ 2 (∆θ 1 < 0, ∆θ 2 < 0) and increasing the perceived value of θ 3 (∆θ 3 > 0). This approach is more beneficial for the attacker than decreasing m and increasing p because the objective is quadratic in m but only linear in p. In the double-bluff situation, however, the defender expects the attacker to employ this optimal strategy, and so the attacker does the exact opposite (encourages the defender to increase p and decrease m), which provides a slight additional benefit over the simple manipulation case. Manipulating constraints gave the attacker more options than manipulating the objective function parameters. As Table 2 shows, constraint manipulation was also much more effective as an attacker strategy. For example, when the attacker attempted to maximize power consumption against a defender who did not believe an attack was underway (Power Max, Normal), the attacker was able to increase power consumption by almost 30% compared with the baseline. Attempting to maximize the constraint violation (Break System, Normal) resulted in a significant level of violation, too.
In this case, there were also major consequences for wrongly anticipating an attack. Anticipating a power maximization attack when there was no attack resulted in a worse constraint violation than when the attacker was deliberately trying to break the system. Conversely, anticipating a 'break system' attack when the actual attack was a 'power max' attack led to an increase in power consumption of almost 60% compared with the baseline. Note that in these false anticipations, the attacker is assuming that the defender is just playing normally (i.e., the attacker is not taking advantage of the defender's mistake). The double-bluff strategies did not provide much benefit to the attacker, though. Table 3 shows the perturbations used to produce the behaviour seen in Table 2 . We can see that the attacker strategies for maximizing power consumption and breaking the system are almost exactly mirror opposites, which makes sense. The double-bluff strategies are not that much different than the regular strategies that they correspond to, though, so it is not surprising that the double-bluff approach is not very effective. Switching attack modes would be a better option if the defender is anticipating an attack, and though we did not calculate this here, it would be possible to calculate an optimal attack for one mode given that the defender is expecting the other mode. Given how the two modes produce almost exact opposite attacker strategies, the attacker strategy would likely be quite similar to the same attack mode employed against an unsuspecting defender.
We can postulate that, general, changes in constraint parameters may result in larger objective function changes than changes in objective function parameters for two reasons. Firstly, the changes in constraints will be multiplied by the dual variables (Lagrange or Kuhn-Tucker) associated with those constraints to produce a final change in the objective function. Secondly, changing constraint values may result in the active set at the optimum also changing, and that could produce large, nonlinear changes in the objective function. All in all, this likely makes constraint manipulation a much more attractive target for a would-be attacker than objective function manipulation. 
Single-Zone HVAC Control
In the baseline case, and for all of the adversarial perturbations, m t and d t were both at their lower bounds for the entire optimization. Figure 1 shows the defender strategy in more detail for different optimization horizon lengths. There, we see that the defender essentially allows the zone to evolve without manipulation until the last time step. Because T t 0 > T t n , this means that the zone warms over time, but because γ is very small, this happens slowly. At the last time step, the defender then chills the zone back to the initial temperature. We can see this in the sudden drop in T t s at the end of each time horizon; note that the optimization produces T t s = T t s,n for each optimization. This general behaviour is seen when the attacker manipulates defender perceptions, too.
The longer the optimization time horizon, the larger the drop in T t s at the last time step. If the length of the time horizon were increased sufficiently, eventually the system would require multiple steps of cooling, because T t s would hit its lower bound. T t n never hit its upper bound, but if it did, this would also require additional cooling prior to the end of the optimization horizon. Table 4 shows that manipulating the defender's perception of β and γ resulted in small power increases, relative to the baseline, and small discrepancies between the actual and perceived power use. The perturbations themselves also change slightly as the length of the time horizon changes; there is a greater emphasis on ∆β as the time horizon gets longer. In this model, β essentially measures how hard it is to change the zone temperature with the HVAC system. Setting ∆β < 0 makes the defender think that the zone is harder to adjust than it actually is. The γ parameter then captures the heat transfer between the zone and the outside environment. Setting ∆γ > 0 makes the defender think that there is more heat transfer than there actually is. All of this combines to increase the amount of cooling that the defender thinks is necessary at the end. The ∆T plots in Figure 2 show this kind of behaviour: the defender thinks that the temperatures are higher than they actually are and therefore overcompensates at the end. This overcompensation leads to an increase in power use and a final T t n value that is actually slightly lower than it should be. Next, we can look at the λ mean values given in Table 4 . λ mean is the average of the Lagrange multipliers associated with Equation 54 and therefore provides a measure of how the ∆β and ∆γ perturbations get multiplied. This value increases as the time horizon lengthens, which makes sense: as the time horizon lengthens, the importance of the thermal evolution process increases. An attacker perturbing β and γ would want this value to be as large (positive or negative) as possible. Table 5 shows that manipulating T t 0 provided a much larger increase in power consumption as well as a larger difference between the perceived and actual power consumption. λ mean is also much smaller, and these phenomena are related. The static parameters could only affect the power consumption indirectly through the temperature evolution equation. T t 0 , however, shows up in the objective function and another constraint in addition to the temperature evolution equation, so increasing λ mean becomes less important. In this case, misperceptions of T t i and T t n become smaller (see Figure 2 ) and less important to the attacker. Instead, the attacker uses ∆T t 0 > 0 to get the defender to increase T t i , and thus 
T t n = 0) as well as the chiller. The perturbations themselves follow a clear pattern, as shown in Figure 3 . They increase very slightly over time until the last time step, at which point they drop to nearly zero. The last step is less valuable to the attacker because there are no more thermal evolution steps left in the optimization at that point. Table 6 provides an overall summary of the power consumption results. Generally speaking, the relative payoff for the attacker increases with the length of the time horizon. The actual power consumed in the static parameter manipulation scenario, relative to the baseline, is roughly proportional to the length of the time horizon, but the other three cases in Table 6 all seem to plateau. 
Discussion
Stuxnet-like Attacks and Hypergames
In this paper, we showed examples of how an attacker with knowledge of the system in question could manipulate the optimization processes of that system. These problems were relatively small, but they were sufficient to show how the analysis would work. Hypergames are about strategic interactions when there are misperceptions and/or information asymmetries. In this case, we were able to show how those asymmetries or misperceptions could affect system performance; for example, getting the defender to respond to a non-existent threat could actually prove to be a very effective attacker strategy. We could consider more complex interactions, and we intend to do so in future work, but that future work will need to build upon the basics outlined here.
When we look at Stuxnet as a motivating example for this work, we can see that there are many similarities as well as some key differences between Stuxnet and the cases considered here. In both Stuxnet and our case studies, the attacker employed relatively small deviations to avoid detection; we modelled this using the concept of an attacker budget. Both also involved fake sensor signals (∆T t 0 ) and manipulated calibration values (∆θ i , δ i , ∆β, ∆γ). As Langner points out, and as most papers on the subject gloss over, Stuxnet employed two different kinds of attacks [4] . Our HVAC example had two different kinds of attack modes, and for the fan optimization, there were two attack modes as well as two different attack objectives for one of the modes. One of those fan optimization attack modes (δ i for breaking the system) corresponded very closely to the goal and means of Stuxnet. Finally, Stuxnet and the attacks considered in this paper all utilized deep knowledge of an automated decision-making system to determine how to perform the attack.
There are two primary sets of differences between this paper's case studies and Stuxnet. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, Stuxnet was not optimization-based, and the centrifuge control systems did not employ optimal control. As such, the decision-making processes for both the attacker and the defender were different than in our paper. Secondly, Stuxnet actually overrode the control signals and software to manipulate the centrifuges, whereas our attacks only altered sensor and calibration data.
If we were trying to model the Stuxnet attack itself, these discrepancies would be problematic. Given the more general nature of our investigation here, though, this is less of an issue. Moreover, the key similarities identified above are ones we believe to be relevant to a wide range of control systems that might be threatened by cyber attacks.
Scalability Considerations
A big question in applying these techniques to real-world problems is scalability. These problems were relatively small; even the 20-step HVAC problem had only 120 variables (six per time step) in the baseline problem. How easy would it be to propagate the optimality conditions and solve the resulting MPECs for larger systems? The answer has two parts. Firstly, there is the question of the optimality conditions. If those optimality conditions are necessary but not sufficient, as in general continuous NLP problems, propagating the optimality conditions to turn the multi-level optimization into an MPEC may run into difficulties; multiple optima would be one example of this. That being said, the singlezone HVAC system presented here was a nonconvex problem, and it had no such problems. If there are more than two levels to the optimization, that can also cause difficulties, as the optimization conditions from lower levels compound.
This then leads into the question of tractability. Adding the dual variables of lower level optimizations to the problem description in order to solve the system as an MPEC can greatly increase the number of variables involved; having multiple levels may exacerbate the issue. However, it is sometimes possible to simplify the optimality conditions and thereby remove some of the dual variables (as was done in this paper). The NLP sequential relaxation of the MPEC also scales well and handles the complementarity constraints efficiently.
On the whole, the scalability of this approach will depend on the problem in question and how many levels of (mis)perception are of interest. Hypergames where the individual players' games are differentiable, convex optimization problems are likely to have the greatest amount of success with this approach. Problems with known or constant active constraint sets will also generally be more amenable to the multi-level optimizations than problems with active sets that change.
Future Work
Some authors writing on Stuxnet suggest the use of heuristics to identify attacks [6, 31] . One area of future work would be to take existing research on learning in repeated hypergames [27, 32] and apply it to this context. For this, we would consider the defender's ability to detect attacks as well as the attacker's behaviour when the non-detection constraint is endogenous rather than exogenous (as with the attacker budget imposed here). Another area of interest would be the defender's decision-making more generally. Given the possibility of attack and the potential consequences (as calculated in this paper), how should a defender respond if an attack is undetectable beforehand? Hypergame results here should enable us to to evaluate and prescribe control policies more broadly. Finally, we intend to extend this work to larger, real-world systems. Working on such systems may then also involve more complicated attacker manipulations, but we anticipate being able to use the same techniques demonstrated here.
Conclusions
In this paper, we showed how hypergames can be extended to situations with continuous and time-varying variables. That extension allowed us to consider the effects of adversarial perturbations in an optimal control context, which can give us insights into the control aspects of a Stuxnet-like attack. We found that manipulating constraints can be a more effective attacker strategy than directly manipulating objective function parameters. Moreover, the attacker need not change the underlying system in any way to carry out a successful attack -it may be sufficient simply to deceive the defender controlling the system. It is possible to scale our approach up to larger systems, but the ability to do so will depend on the characteristics of the system in question, and we identified several characteristics that will make larger systems amenable to hypergame analysis.
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A Static Fan Optimization Calculations
A.1 Baseline Problem
The baseline defender optimization is min m,p
Note that we include the 1/2 factor in the constraint to cancel out factors of 2 that appear when taking the derivative of that constraint. The objective function and inequality constraint are both convex functions, so the optimization is a convex problem and the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient to define problem optima. If we define the Lagrangian as L and use λ as the dual variable associated with the inequality constraint, we get the following optimality conditions:
For these equations to be satisfied, λ = 0. Since λ ≥ 0, this ensures that p < c p . Moreover, if c r is sufficiently small, m > 0, and thus m < c m . We can then get rid of λ by substitution, and we are left with
A.2 Objective Function Manipulation
A.2.1 Attacker Manipulates True/Physical Properties and Defender Knows
The min-max problem is
We can use the attacker's KKT conditions to transform the min-max problem into a pure optimization problem. Define L as the Lagrangian and σ as the dual variable associated with the attacker budget constraint. Then
For finite ∆θ i , we require σ = 0. Since we know, by definition, that σ ≥ 0, σ > 0. We can therefore parameterize the attacker's decisions in terms of τ = 1/σ:
Given that the last constraint will always be active (σ = 0), we can solve for τ :
We are then left with the following defender optimization: 
A.2.2 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions, Defender Unaware
The attacker is solving the problem
subject to the defender optimization min m,p
The optimality conditions of the defender problem are the same as in the baseline case except that we replace θ i withθ i = θ i + ∆θ i :
This then results in the optimization problem for the attacker:
where the dual variable for each constraint is shown in brackets next to that constraint. We can solve this directly as an optimization, but we can also use the optimality conditions to calculate ∆θ i . Define L as the optimization's Lagrangian. Then
If we use τ = λ/µ, we get
We know that µ > 0, but in principle λ could be positive or negative. When we solve the optimization directly (using the parameter values specified in the main body of the paper), we find that λ > 0. Given that p − c p < 0 and m − c m < 0, this means that the attacker decreases the defender-perceived values of θ 1 and θ 2 while raising the defender-perceived value of θ 3 . This in turn results in an increased value of m and a decreased value of p (relative to the unperturbed case). The case where λ < 0 would correspond to the opposite behaviour.
Both options produce local maxima, for the attacker, but in general, we would expect the λ > 0 option to produce a higher payoff: the objective is linear in p but quadratic in m, so increasing m would often provide a greater payoff than increasing p. We do not have a proof delineating when this is the case, but we would expect this not to be the case only for small values of θ 1 and θ 2 (relative to θ 3 ). For the c m , c p , c r , and c max values considered in this paper, we can empirically verify that for θ 1 ∈ [0.5, 3.5], θ 2 ∈ [0.5, 3.5], and θ 3 ∈ [0.5, 3.5], the λ > 0 option provides a larger attacker payoff. This domain encompasses all of the true θ i values that an attacker could manipulate to produce theθ i values observed by the defender. Since the defender knows the attacker budget, if the defender believes that the attacker is attempting to perturb θ i , the defender can know that the attacker is employing the attack where τ > 0.
A.2.3 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions, Defender is Aware
Using the results from the previous section, the defender can reverse engineer the true θ i values from the perceived valuesθ i if the defender is aware of an attack. The defender believes thatθ i has been calculated by an attacker solving problem A.2.2. Therefore the defender's optimization is min m,p
wherem andp are the decision variable values that the defender thinks that the attacker expects the defender to employ. Note that it is possible to solve
once with the knownθ i values and then use those to calculate ∆θ i -these do not depend on m or p. Once this calculation has been performed, we are left with the original convex defender optimization problem.
A.2.4 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions, Defender is Aware, Attacker Knows that Defender is Aware
This problem leads us to a multi-level optimization problem. At level 1, we have the attacker optimization
At the next level (level 2), we have the defender optimization. The defender performs his optimization based on the belief that the values he perceives,θ i has been perturbed by an attacker solving problem A.2.2. Therefore the defender's optimization is min m,p
The defender's optimality conditions (level 2) are then:
The attacker's optimization (level 1) is then
The attacker optimization may not be convex, but each ∆θ i value corresponds to a single (m,p, m, p) tuple. We can show by via a sequential analysis. The equations
define a unique solution (m,p) to an instance of the unaware defender optimization. By the logic employed in the previous section, we can calculate ∆θ i values from that, which then in turn defines m and p as the unique solution to
A.3 Constraint Manipulation
In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the attacker is only manipulating the constraint parameters (not the objective function parameters). These constraint manipulations take the form ofĉ
The attacker is also subject to an attack budget of
A.3.1 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions, Defender Unaware
The attacker's optimization is
The defender optimality conditions are
and we are left with the attacker optimization
A.3.2 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions, Defender is Aware
The defender's optimization is min m,p
whereĉ m ,ĉ p , andĉ r are the quantities that the defender perceives (which the defender believes to have been manipulated by the attacker). The true parameter values are unknown, but the δ i values are calculated by solving the attacker problem from the previous section:
where the dual variables for each constraint are shown in brackets beside the equation Define L as the Lagrangian for this problem. The optimality conditions are then
If we take the first two equations and simplify usingĉ i , we get
We can set this up to solve for σ and ρ:
We can then use these expressions for σ and ρ to calculate our δ i values in terms of τ = 1/µ:
The constraint on the sum of squared δ i values then lets us calculate a value for τ :
and thus we have closed-form expressions for the δ i values that can then be plugged back into the original defender optimization without needing to know the true c i values.
A.3.3 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions, Defender is Aware, Attacker Knows that Defender is Aware
subject to the defender optimization from the previous section. The optimality conditions for the defender's optimization are
A.3.4 Attacker Manipulates Defender to Break System, Defender is Unaware
In this case, the attacker wants to cause the defender to deviate maximally from the constraint 1 2 (m − c m ) 2 + (p − c p ) 2 − r 2 ≤ 0 in the interest of causing a catastrophic failure. The attacker's optimization is
A.3.5 Attacker Manipulates Defender to Break System, Defender Knows
The defender's optimization is
where the defender only observesĉ i and needs to calculate δ i . The defender knows that the attacker is solving the problem
where the dual variables for each constraint are shown in brackets beside their respective equations. If we define L as the Lagrangian for that problem, the optimality conditions for this problem are
We can solve for σ, ρ, and τ = 1/µ to get expressions for δ i .
Unlike the result in the power maximization case, solving for δ i requires knowing c i , not justĉ i . The defender then has to solve
B Single-Zone HVAC Control Calculations
B.1 Baseline Problem
The baseline problem is a power minimization problem for a heater, chiller, and fan together affecting a single zone of interest:
where the quantities in brackets after each equation are the dual variables corresponding to those equations. A descriptions of the model variables and the model parameters are given in Tables 7 and 8 , respectively. This is a single-zone version of a multi-zone HVAC model. The goal of the system is to manage the temperature in that single zone. To do this, it takes in a mixture of air from the zone and from the environment, heats that air (if necessary) at a central heating unit, cools the air (if necessary) with a chiller, and uses a fan to send the air through HVAC ducting. In a multi-zone model, there would be a local heater for each zone to provide any zone-specific heating; for our single-zone model, we retain the local heater in the interest of maintaining the same model structure. At each time step t, the fan consumes power θ 1 m t + θ 2 (m t ) 2 to move air through the system, the chiller consumes power ν c c p m t (T t i − T t s ), and the central heating unit consumes power ν h c p m t (T t i − d t T t 0 − (1 − d t ) T t n ) and the zonal heater consumes power c p ν n m t T t s,n − T t s . Most of the constraints are variable upper and lower bounds or physical constraints on the system (e.g., the temperature evolution of the room, the heater outputting air that is at least as warm as the air it takes in). However, there is an endpoint constraint T τ n = T 0 n that is essentially a design constraint: at the end of the optimization horizon, the zone needs to be at the same temperature it was at the beginning of the horizon. If we define the Lagrangian for this problem as L, the optimality conditions for this problem are ∂L ∂m t = θ 1 + 2θ 2 m t + ν h c p T t i − d t T t 0 − 1 − d t T t n + c p ν n T t s,n − T t s +ν c c p T t i − T t s + λ t β T t s,n − T t n + σ t m,u − σ t m,l = 0 (256) ∂L ∂d t = ν h c p m t T t n − T t 0 + σ t d,u − σ t d,l − σ t in T t n − T t 0 = 0 (257) plus the optimization problem constraints listed above; note that δ tτ , is a Kronecker delta, so it is 1 if t = τ and 0 otherwise. These derivative conditions can simplify down to
In general, this problem is nonconvex. However, the parameter values specified above result in m t = m l and d t = d l for all t. If we take these variables as constants, then the objective function and constraints are all linear in the model variables, so the optimization is a linear program, and the optimality conditions are then necessary and sufficient. More generally, as long as the fan consumes most of the power (as it does in this case), it will be advantageous to keep m t as small as possible, and as long as the environment temperature differs from the zone temperature, the controller will always be incentivized to minimize the amount of outside air brought in (air that will have to be heated or cooled to reach the zone temperature).
B.2 Attacker Manipulates Defender Perceptions
The attacker can manipulate the defender's perception of β and γ to maximize power consumption over the entire time horizon: 
